Abstract-Determining anomalies in data streams that are collected and transformed from various types of networks has recently attracted significant research interest. Principal component analysis (PCA) has been extensively applied to detecting anomalies in network data streams. However, none of existing PCA-based approaches addresses the problem of identifying the sources that contribute most to the observed anomaly, or anomaly localization. In this paper, we propose novel sparse PCA methods to perform anomaly detection and localization for network data streams. Our key observation is that we can localize anomalies by identifying a sparse low-dimensional space that captures the abnormal events in data streams. To better capture the sources of anomalies, we incorporate the structure information of the network stream data in our anomaly localization framework. Furthermore, we extend our joint sparse PCA framework with multidimensional Karhunen Loè ve Expansion that considers both spatial and temporal domains of data streams to stabilize localization performance. We have performed comprehensive experimental studies of the proposed methods and have compared our methods with the state-of-the-art using three real-world data sets from different application domains. Our experimental studies demonstrate the utility of the proposed methods.
D
ETERMINING anomalies in data streams that are collected and transformed from various types of networks has recently attracted significant research interest in the data mining community [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . Applications of the work could be found in network traffic data [4] , sensor network streams [1] , social networks [3] , cloud computing [5] , and finance networks [2] among others.
The common limitation of aforementioned methods is that they are incapable of determining the sources that contribute most to the observed anomalies or anomaly localization. With fast-accumulating stream data, an outstanding data analysis issue is anomaly localization, where we aim to discover the specific sources that contribute most to the observed anomalies. Anomaly localization in network data streams is apparently critical to many applications, including monitoring the state of buildings [6] or locating the sites for flooding and forest fires [7] . In the stock market, pinpointing the change points in a set of stock price time series is critical for making intelligent trading decisions [8] . For network security, localizing the sources of the most serious threats in computer networks helps ensure security in networks [9] .
Principal component analysis (PCA) is arguably the most widely applied unsupervised anomaly detection technique for network data streams [9] , [10] , [11] . However, a fundamental problem of PCA, as claimed in [12] , is that the current PCA-based anomaly detection methods cannot be applied to anomaly localization. We believe that the major obstacle for extending PCA techniques to anomaly localization lies in the mixed nature of the abnormal space. In particular, the projection of the data streams in the abnormal subspace is a combination of data from all the sources, which makes any localization difficult. Our key observation is that if we manage to identify a lowdimensional approximation of the abnormal subspace using a subset of sources, we "localize" the abnormal sources. The starting point of our investigation hence is the recently studied sparse PCA framework [13] , where PCA is formalized in a sparse regression problem where each principal component (PC) is a sparse linear combination of the original sources. However, sparse PCA does not fit directly into our problems in that sparse PCA enforces sparsity randomly in the normal and abnormal subspaces. In this paper, we explore two directions in improving sparse PCA for anomaly detection and localization.
First, we develop a new regularization scheme to simultaneously calculate the normal subspace and the sparse abnormal subspace. In the normal subspace, we do not add any regularization but use the same normal subspace as ordinary PCA for anomaly detection. In the abnormal subspace, we enforce that different PCs share the same sparse structure; hence; it is able to do anomaly localization. We call this method joint sparse PCA (JSPCA).
Second, we observe that abnormal streams are usually correlated to each other. For example, in stock market, index changes in different countries are often correlated. For incorporating stream correlation in anomaly localization, we design a graph-guided sparse PCA (GJSPCA) technique. Our experimental studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches on three realworld data sets from financial markets, wireless sensor networks, and machinery operating condition studies.
A major drawback of PCA-based anomaly detection methods is that the performance of the methods is very sensitive to the number of PCs representing the normal subspace. To overcome this problem, we introduce a multidimensional Karhunen Loève Expansion (KLE) as an extension of PCA (one-dimensional KLE) to consider the spatial correlation among different sources and the temporal correlation among different time stamps [14] . The corresponding methods are named joint sparse KLE (JSKLE) and graph-guided sparse KLE (GJSKLE), respectively. The experimental results demonstrate that the JSKLE and GJSKLE effectively stabilize localization performance when changing the number of PCs representing the normal subspace.
As an example of anomaly detection and anomaly localization in network data streams, we show the normalized stock index streams of eight countries over a period of three months in Fig. 1 . We notice an anomaly in the marked window between time stamps 25 and 42. In that window, sources 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 (denoted by dotted lines) are normal sources. Sources 2, 3, and 7 (denoted by solid lines) are abnormal ones because they have a different trend from that of the other sources. In the marked window, the three abnormal sources clearly share the same increasing trend while the rest share a decreasing trend.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present related work of anomaly localization. In Section 3, we discuss the challenge of applying PCA to anomaly localization. In Section 4, we introduce the formulation of JSPCA and GJSPCA, their extended version JSKLE, GJSKLE, and the related optimization algorithm. We present our experimental study in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
RELATED WORK
Existing work on anomaly localization from network data streams could be roughly divided into two categories: those at the source level and those at the network level. The source-level anomaly localization approaches embed detection algorithm at each stream source, resulting in a fully distributed anomaly detection system [5] , [15] , [16] . The major problem of these approaches is that source-level anomalies may not be indicative of network level anomalies due to the ignorance of the rest of the network [10] .
To improve source-level anomaly localization methods, several algorithms have been recently proposed to localize anomaly at the network level. Brauckhoff et al. [17] applied association rule mining to network traffic data to extract abnormal flows from the large set of candidate flows. Their work is based on the assumption that anomalies often result in many flows with similar characteristics. Such an assumption holds in network traffic data streams but may not be true in other data streams such as finance data. Keogh et al. [18] proposed a nearest neighbor-based approach to identify abnormal subsequences within univariate time series data by sliding windows. They extracted all possible subsequences and located the one with the largest euclidean distance from its closest nonoverlapping subsequences. However, the method only works for univariate time series generated from a single source. In addition, if the data are distributed on a noneuclidean manifold, two subsequences may appear deceptively close as measured by their euclidean distance [19] . LungYut-Fong et al. [20] developed a nonparametric changepoint test based on U-statistics to detect and localize change points in high-dimensional network traffic data. The limitation is that the method is specifically designed for the denial-of-service (DOS) attack in communication networks and cannot be generalized to other types of network data streams easily.
Closely related to our work, Idé et al. [21] , [22] measured the change of neighborhood graph for each source to perform anomaly localization and developed a method called stochastic nearest neighbor (SNN). Hirose et al. [23] designed an algorithm named eigen equation compression (EEC) to localize anomalies by measuring the deviation of covariance matrix of neighborhood sources. In these two studies, we have to build a neighborhood graph for each source for each time interval, which is unlikely to scale to a large number of sources. Another closely related work to ours is the stream projected outlier detector (SPOT) [24] , in which a subspace is learned with genetic algorithm from a potential huge number of subsets of sources and the outliers in temporal domain are detected in the reduced subspace. The limitation of their work is that they used a genetic algorithm to select a subset of sources. The computational complexity to find the optimum set grows exponentially with the number of features, and there is no guarantee that we will reach the optimal subset of sources. Our work formalizes anomaly localization via a sparse regularization framework and solved it efficiently with a convex optimization technique. Furthermore, the anomalies may not be observable in the original space. Instead of coping with original space, we localize anomalies in abnormal subspace in which the anomalous behaviors of data are significant. Compared with [24] , Yang and Zhou [25] learned the subspace with locally linear embedding and PCA and then detect outliers in the reduced space. However, there is no mapping between the newly learned space and original data space; therefore, it is not applicable for anomaly localization. Cao et al. [26] partitioned data streams within a window into clusters based on their similarity, and outliers were detected on each individual cluster. A stream is an outlier if the number of streams lies within a predefined distance is smaller than k. However, if normal instances do not have enough close neighbors or if the abnormal instances that have enough close neighbors, the technique may have high level of false positive and false negative.
We have investigated the anomaly localization problem in our previous publications [27] , [28] . In [27] , we proposed a two-step approach where we first compute normal subspace from ordinary PCA and then derive a sparse abnormal subspace on the residual data subtracted from the original data. The critical limitation of the two stage method is that after removing the abnormal subspace, the resulting data are a linear combination of all the sources. It is very difficult to identify which source contributes most to the observed anomaly. In [28] , we designed a single-step approach to jointly learn normal subspace for anomaly detection and sparse abnormal subspace for anomaly localization. In this paper, we substantially extended [28] by generalizing our proposed JSPCA framework to KLE. KLE considers both temporal and spatial correlation of data, and it has been shown to reduce the sensitivity from the choice of number of PCs [14] . We also extended the experiment study by adding one more data set. Our experimental studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method over the state of the art.
PCA is extensively applied to network data streams anomaly detection [9] , [10] , [11] . For example, Lakhina et al. applied PCA to detect network traffic anomalies. Huang et al. [10] developed a distributed PCA anomaly detector by equipping a local filter in each source. Brauckhoff et al. [14] consider both the temporal and spatial correlation of streamed data by extending PCA to KLE and solve the sensitivity problem of PCA proposed by Ringberg et al. [12] . The major limitation of these works, as pointed out in in [12] , is that PCA cannot be applied to anomaly localization.
PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the notations used in this paper and background information regarding PCA and sparse PCA.
Notation
We use bold uppercase letters such as X to denote a matrix and bold lowercase letters such as x to denote a vector. Greek letters such as 1 ; 2 are Lagrangian multipliers.
hA; Bi represents the matrix inner product defined as hA; Bi ¼ trðA T BÞ, where tr represents the matrix trace. Given a matrix X, we use x ij to denote the entry of X at the ith row and jth column. We use x i to represent the ith entry of a vector x.
kx i k q is the l 1 =l q norm of the matrix X, wherẽ x i is the ith row of X in column vector form. Unless stated otherwise, all vectors are column vectors. In Table 1 , we summarize the notations in our paper.
Network Data Streams
Our work focuses on data streams that are collected from multiple sources. We call the set of data stream sources together as a network because we often have information regarding the structure of the sources.
Following [29] , network data streams are multivariate time series S from p sources where S ¼ fS i ðtÞg and i 2 ½1; p. p is the dimensionality of the network data streams. Each function S i : IR ! IR is a source. A source is also called a "node" in the communication network community and a "feature" in the data mining and machine learning community.
Typically, we focus on time series sampled at (synchronized) discrete time stamps ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g. In such cases, the network data streams are represented as a matrix X ¼ ðx i;j Þ where i 2 ½1; n, j 2 ½1; p, and x i;j is the reading of the stream source j at the time sample t i .
Applying PCA for Anomaly Localization
Our goal is to explore a PCA-based method for performing anomaly detection and localization simultaneously. A PCAbased anomaly detection technique has been widely investigated in [9] , [10] , [11] . In applying PCA to anomaly detection, one first constructs the normal subspace spanned by V ð1Þ (the top k PCs) and the abnormal subspace spanned by V ð2Þ (the remaining p-k PCs), then projects the original data on V ð1Þ and V ð2Þ as
where X 2 IR nÂp is the data matrix with n time stamps from p data sources, X n and X a are the projections of X on normal subspace and abnormal subspace, respectively. The underlying assumption of PCA-based anomaly detection is that X n corresponds to the regular trends and X a captures the abnormal behaviors in the data streams. By performing statistical testing on the squared [9] , [10] . The larger SP E is, the more likely an anomaly exists.
Although PCA has been widely studied for anomaly detection, it is not applicable for anomaly localization. The fundamental problem, as claimed in [12] , lies in the fact that there is no direct mapping between two matrices V ð1Þ and V ð2Þ and the data sources. Specifically, let V ð2Þ be the last p À k PCs that spans the abnormal subspace, X a is essentially an aggregated operation that performs linear combination of all the data sources, as follows:
where x j is the data from the jth source andṽ j is the transpose of the jth row of V ð2Þ . Considering the ith column of X a :
, there is no correspondence between the original ith column of X and ith column of X a . Such an aggregation makes PCA difficult to identify the particular sources that are responsible for the observed anomalies.
Although all the previous works claim that PCA-based anomaly detection methods cannot do localization, we solve the problem of anomaly localization in a reverse way. Instead of locating the anomalies directly, we filter normal sources to identify anomalies by employing the fact that normal subspace captures the general trend of data and normal sources have little or no projection on abnormal subspace. The following provides a sufficient condition for data sources to have no projection on abnormal subspace. Suppose I ¼ fi jṽ i ¼ 0g is the set that contains all the indices for the zero rows of V ð2Þ , then 8i 2 S, x i has no projection on the abnormal subspace. In other words, these sources have no contribution to the abnormal behavior. Let V ð2Þ ¼ ½ṽ 1 ;ṽ 2 ; . . . ;ṽ p T , and consider the squared prediction error SP E ¼ trðX T a X a Þ and plug (2) in
From (3), it is clear that 8i 2 I, the data x i from the source i have no projection on the abnormal subspace and hence could be excluded from the statistics used for anomaly detection. We call such a pattern with an entire row of zeros "joint sparsity."
Unfortunately, ordinary PCA does not afford sparsity in PCs. Sparse PCA is a recently developed algorithms where each PC is a sparse linear combination of the original sources [13] . However, existing sparse PCA method has no guarantee that different PCs share the same sparse representation and hence has no guarantee for the joint sparsity. To illustrate the point, we plotted the entries of each PC for ordinary PCA (Fig. 2a ) and for sparse PCA (Fig. 2b) for the stock data set shown in Fig. 1 . White blocks indicate zero entries, and the darker color indicates a larger absolute loading. Sparse PCA produces sparse entries but that alone does not indicate sources that contribute most to the observed anomaly.
Below, we present our extensions of PCA that enable us to reduce dimensionality in the abnormal subspace.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we propose a novel regularization framework called JSPCA to enforce joint sparsity in PCs in the abnormal space while preserving the PCs in the normal subspace so that we can perform simultaneous anomaly detection and anomaly localization. Starting from JSPCA, we proposed two extensions. In the first extension, we consider the network topology in the original data and incorporate such topology into JSPCA and develop an approach called GJSPCA. In the second, we extend JSPCA and GJSPCA to JSKLE and GJSKLE, which taking the temporal correlation into account as well as spatial correlation considered in JSPCA and GJSPCA.
Before formally providing the detailed methods, we give an overall workflow of our method as shown in Fig. 4 for JSPCA. Note that the rest methods share the same flow, and we only show JSCPA for simplicity.
Given several data streams, the first step is to calculate a set of PCs with an ordinary normal subspace and abnormal subspace with joint sparsity. Our example as shown in Fig. 3 is a network with three sources, then a 3 Â 3 PC matrix is calculated by JSPCA. The first PC with nonzero entries represents the normal subspace. The subtraction between original data and the projection on normal subspace is used for anomaly detection. The remaining two PCs represent abnormal subspace, with the first two rows being zero but the last row being nonzero. Based on the abnormal subspace, the second step is to calculate the abnormal scores. A larger score indicates larger possibility of the corresponding source is abnormal. Therefore, we complete the task of anomaly detection and localization simultaneously.
Joint Sparse PCA
Our objective here is to derive a set of PCs V ¼ ½V ð1Þ ; V ð3Þ such that V ð1Þ is the normal subspace and V ð3Þ is a sparse approximation of the abnormal subspace with the joint sparsity. The following regularization framework guarantees the two properties simultaneously: Using one variable V, we simplify (4) as
Here, is the Hadamard product operator (entrywise product), is a scalar controlling the balance between sparse and fitness, 
The regularization term kW Vk 1;2 is called group lasso penalty [30] , in which L 2 norm is used to aggregate the coefficients within a group and L 1 norm is applied to achieve sparsity among groups. In our framework, each group is corresponding to a row of the abnormal subspace matrix V ð3Þ and L 1 =L 2 penalty enforces joint sparsity for each source across the abnormal subspace.
The major disadvantage of (5) is that it poses a difficult optimization problem since the first term (the trace norm) is concave and the second term (the L 1 =L 2 norm) is convex. The similar situation was first investigated in sparse PCA [13] with elastic net penalty [31] , in which two variables and an alternative optimization algorithm were introduced. Here, we share the first least square loss term but adopt a different regularization term. Motivated by Zou et al. [13] , we consider a relaxed version:
where A; B 2 IR pÂp . The advantage of the new formalization is twofold: First, (7) is convex to each subproblem when fixing one variable and optimizing the other. As asserted in [13] disregarding the Lasso penalty, the solution of (7) corresponds to exact PCA; second, we only impose penalty on the remaining p À k PCs and preserve the top k PCs representing the normal subspace from ordinary PCA. Such a formalization will guarantee that we have the ordinary normal subspace for anomaly detection and the sparse abnormal subspace for anomaly localization. Note that Jenatton et al. [32] recently proposed a structured sparse PCA, which is similar to our formalization. But their structure is defined on groups and cannot be directly applied for anomaly localization. 
Anomaly Scoring
To quantitatively measure the degree of anomalies for each source, we define anomaly score and normalized anomaly score as following: Definition 4.1. Given p sources and the approximated abnormal subspace represented by V ð3Þ from JSPCA, the anomaly score for source i; i ¼ 1; . . . ; p is defined on the normalized L 1 norm of the ith row of V ð3Þṽ i :
whereṽ ij is the jth entry ofṽ i .
For each input data matrix X, (8) results in a vector ¼ ½ 1 ; . . . ; p T of anomaly scores. The normalized score for source i is defined as i ¼ i =maxf i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; pg. A higher score indicates a higher probability that a source is abnormal. We show the anomaly scores obtained from PCA, SPCA, JSPCA, for the stock data in Fig. 5 . JSPCA succeeds to localize three anomalies by assigning nonzero scores to anomalous sources and zero to normal ones, while PCA and SPCA both fail. With abnormal scores, we can rank abnormality or generate ROC curve to evaluate localization performance. Bellow, we give a skeleton of algorithm for computing abnormal score, and the detailed optimization algorithm is introduced later. (7)), V ð1Þ is normal subspace, V ð3Þ is abnormal subspace with joint sparsity; 4: Compute abnormal score for each source by the definition (4.1);
Graph-Guided JSPCA
In many real-world applications, the sources generating the data streams may have structure, which may or may not change with time. As the example mentioned in Fig. 1 , stock indices from sources 2, 3, and 7 are closely correlated over a long time interval. If sources 2 and 3 are anomalies as demonstrated in Fig. 4a , it is very likely that source 7 is an anomaly as well. This observation motivates us to develop a regularization framework that enforces smoothness across features. In particular, we model the structure among sources with an undirected graph, where each node represents a source and each edge encodes a possible structure relationship. We hypothesize that incorporating structure information of sources, we can build a more accurate and reliable anomaly localization model. Below, we introduce the graph-guided JSPCA, which effectively encodes the structure information in the anomaly localization framework. To achieve the goal of smoothness of features, we add an extended l 2 (Tikhonov) regularization factor on the graph Laplacian regularized matrix norm of the p À k PCs. This is an extension of the l 2 norm regularized Laplacian on a single vector in [33] . With this addition, we obtain the following optimization problem:
where L is the Laplacian of a graph that captures the correlation structure of sources [33] .
In Fig. 4 , we show the comparison of applying JSPCA and GJSPCA on the data shown in Fig. 1 . Both JSPCA and GJSPCA correctly localize the abnormal sources 2, 3, and 7.
Comparing JSPCA and GJSPCA, we observe that in GJSPCA the entry values corresponding to the three abnormal sources 2, 3, and 7 are closer (a.k.a. smoothness in the feature space). In the raw data, we observe that sources 2, 3, and 7 share an increasing trend. The smoothness is the reflection of the shared trend and helps highlight the abnormal source 7. As evaluated in our experimental study, GJSPCA outperforms JSPCA. We believe that the additional structure information utilized in GJSPCA helps.
The same observation is also shown in Fig. 5 . Comparing JSPCA and GJSPCA, we find that JSPCA assigns higher anomaly scores to sources 2 and 3 but a lower score to source 7, and GJSPCA has smooth effect on the abnormal scores. It assigns similar scores for the three sources. The similar scores demonstrate the effect of smooth regularization term induced by the graph Laplacian. The smoothness also sheds light on the reason why GJSPCA outperforms JSPCA a little in anomaly localization in our detailed experimental evaluation.
Extension with KLE
A limitation of PCA is that it only considers the spatial correlation but ignores the temporal correlation. As an extension of PCA, KLE was introduced to solved this problem in [14] by taking both spatial and temporal correlation into consideration. In [14] , Brauckhoff et al. claimed that by extending PCA to KLE, they stabilized the anomaly detection performance and reduced the sensitivity of PCA when changing the number of PCs representing the normal subspace [12] . Since JSPCA and GJSPCA are based on PCA, they both involve the same problem proposed in [12] .
In this section, we extend our regularization framework to KLE, called JSKLE and GJSKLE, respectively. Our contributions are to formalize a regularized JSPCA with KLE for localization and design efficient optimization algorithms to solve the objective with KLE. Our goal is to stabilize localization performance and reduce the localization performance sensitivity. Such advantage will be illustrated in our experimental studies. For the details of derivation KLE and its connection with ordinary PCA, refer to the appendix, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TKDE.2012.176. However, it is nontrivial to adopt the regularization framework proposed in (7) and (9) to expanded data matrix X 0 because the data stream from each source has been extended from a vector to a matrix. The model parameters corresponding to each source also become a matrix, namely B ¼ ½B T where B i is a N by pN matrix. The top k PCs of B representing the normal subspace in regular PCA will become kN PCs after KLE extension. Similarly, abnormal subspace is the rest ðp À kÞN PCs of B. More specifically, we consider the following optimization problem similar to the objective of JSKLE:
where W j 2 f0; 1g NÂpN is the jth matrix block of W T ¼ ½W 1 ; W 2 ; . . . ; W p similar to (6) with first kN columns being 0s and the rest being 1s:
For GJSKLE, we have to adjust the structured trace regularization component for extended data. Since each source has been extended to multiple streams, we take average values across the N extended streams and make the average values smooth according to the network topology. More formally, considering the following objective:
where P 2 f0; 1g pÂpN is used to summing each block of B and defined as In Fig. 6 , we show the PC space computed from JSKLE and GJSKLE. There are two PCs representing the normal subspace and the rests presenting the abnormal subspace. Both JSKLE and GJSKLE highlight the abnormal sources, while GJSKLE shows a smooth effect on three abnormal sources 2, 3, and 7.
For JSKLE and GJSKLE, the definition of abnormal score is a little different from that of JSPCA and GJSPCA. Suppose the abnormal subspace is given by V (10) or (11)), the anomaly score for source i; i ¼ 1; . . . ; p is
where V
i is the ith matrix block of V ð3Þ . Abnormal scores computed by JSKLE and GJSKLE are shown in Fig. 6 . JSKLE and GJSKLE perform similarly to JSPCA and GJSPCA but they are insensitive to the number of PCs representing the normal subspace, which will be studied in our experimental studies.
Optimization Algorithms
We present our optimization technique to solve (7), (9), (10), and (11) based on accelerated gradient descent [34] and projected gradient scheme [35] . Since (10) and (11) are similar to (7) and (9), our following discussion will focus on (7) and (9). The solutions for (10) and (11) can be obtained by the same procedure with only minor changes on calculating gradient and gradient projection.
The proposed algorithm is expected to run with a single thread on a single-core machine. The most time-consuming component is the function evaluation and the gradient calculation at each step. However, both the function evaluation and the gradient calculation can be written in a certain "summation form" across training samples and hence follow the statistical query model. Learning algorithms that follow the statistical quer model can be easily parallelized with the MapReduce programming paradigm, as discussed in [36] . Parallelizing learning algorithms is not the focus of the paper; hence; we do not discuss it here. For detailed discussion on statistical query model and utilizing MapRedue to support learning algorithms with the statistical query model, see [36] .
Although (7) and (9) are not joint convex for A and B, they are convex for A and B individually. The algorithm solves A and B iteratively and achieves a local optimum. Due to the space constrain, we provide our optimization algorithm in appendix, available in the online supplemental material.
A given B: If B is fixed, we obtain the optimal A analytically. Ignoring the regularization part, (7) and (9) degenerate to The solution is obtained by a reduced rank form of the Procrustes rotation. We compute the SVD of GB to obtain the solution, where G ¼ X T X is the gram matrix:
Solution in the form of Procrustes rotation is widely discussed; see [13] , for example, for a detailed discussion. B given A: If A is fixed, we consider (9) only since (7) is a special case of (9) when 2 ¼ 0. Now, the optimization problem becomes
Equation (15) can be rewritten as min B F ðBÞ def ¼ fðBÞ þ RðBÞ, where fðBÞ takes the smooth part of (15) fðBÞ
and RðBÞ takes the nonsmooth part, RðBÞ ¼ 1 kW Bk 1;2 .
It is easy to verify that (16) is a convex and smooth function over B and the gradient of f is: rfðBÞ ¼ GðB À AÞ þ 2 LðW BÞ.
Considering the minimization problem of the smooth function fðBÞ using the first order gradient descent method, it is well known that the gradient step has the following update at step i þ 1 with step size 1=L i :
In [37] , [34] , it has shown that the gradient step (17) can be reformulated as a linear approximation of the function f at point B i regularized by a quadratic proximal term as
Based on the relationship, we combine (18) and RðBÞ together to formalize the generalized gradient update step:
The insight of such a formalization is that by exploring the structure of regularization Rð:Þ, we can easily solve the optimization in (19) , then the convergence rate is the same as that of the gradient decent method. In this paper, we use accelerated gradient descent [34] to handle the smooth part and projected gradient scheme [35] to tackle nonsmooth part. Due to the space constrain, we do not discuss detailed procedures, but provide them in the appendix, available in the online supplemental material. We summarize what is briefly discussed previously for GJSPCA in Algorithm 2. Note that JSPCA is a special case of GJSPCA, we obtain the algorithm for JSPCA by setting 2 ¼ 0. For JSKLE and GJSKLE, the only changes are the gradient of smooth parts in the objective (10), (11) and projected gradient given by (17) 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
We have conducted extensive experiments with three realworld data sets to evaluate the performance of JSPCA and GJSPCA on anomaly localization. We implemented our version of three state-of-the-art anomaly localization methods at the network level: SNN [22] , structured sparse learning (SSL) [21] , and EEC [23] since no executables were provided by the original authors. We implemented all four methods with Matlab and performed all experiments on a desktop machine with 6-GB memory and a Intel core i7 2.66-GHz CPU.
Data Sets
We used four real-world data sets from different application domains. For each data set, we singled out several intervals with anomalies. The anomalies are either labeled by the original data provided or manually labeled by ourselves when no labeling is provided. Note that we are only interested in the intervals where anomalies really exist because we focus on localizing anomalies. We used a sliding window with fixed size L and offset L=2 to create multiple data windows from the given intervals. The sliding window moves forward with the offset L=2 until it reaches the end of the intervals. We run all four methods on each data window to evaluate and compare their performances.
To run GJSPCA, we calculated the pairwise correlation between any two sources within the window. We produced a correlation graph for the data streams with a correlation threshold in that if the correlation between two sources is greater than , we connect the two sources with an edge. This construction is meaningful because for highly correlated data, streams influence each other and such influence has been shown critical for better anomaly localization, as evaluated in our experimental studies.
Below, we briefly discuss the data collection and data preprocessing procedures for the three data sets. In Table 2 , we list the intervals that we selected, the dimensionality of the network data streams, the sliding window size L, and the total number of data windows W for each data set. For KDD99 intrusion data set, T is the number of connections and p is the number of features.
The stock indices data set: The stock indices data set includes eight stock market index streams from eight countries: Brazil Since this data set has no ground truth, we manually labeled all the daily indices for the selected intervals. In our labeling, we followed the criteria list in [38] where small turbulence and comovements of most markets are considered as normal, dramatic price changes or significance deviation from the comovement trend (e.g., one index goes up while the others in the market drop down) is considered as abnormal.
The sun spot sensor data set: We collected a sensor data set in a car trial for transport chain security validation using seven wireless Sun Small Programmable Object Technologies (SPOTs). Each SPOT contains a three-axis accelerometer sensor. In our data collection, seven Sun SPOTs were fixed in separated boxes and were loaded on the back seat of a car. Each Sun SPOTs recorded the magnitude of accelerations along x-, y-, z-axis with a sample rate of 390 ms. We simulated a few abnormal events including box removal and replacement, rotation, and flipping. The overall acceleration ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi ðx 2 þ y 2 þ z 2 Þ p was used to detect the designed anomalous events.
The motor current data set: The motor current data are the current observation generated by the state space simulations available at UCR Time Series Archive [39] . The anomalies are the simulated machinery failure in different components of a machine. The current value was observed from 21 different motor operating conditions, including one healthy operating mode and 20 faulty modes. For each motor operating condition, 20 time series were recorded with a length of 1,500 samples. Therefore, there are 20 normal time series and 400 abnormal time series altogether.
In our evaluation, we randomly extracted 20 time series out of 420 with the length 1,500. Ten time series are from normal series and the rest are from abnormal series.
KDDCup 99 intrusion detection data set: The KDDCup99 intrusion detection data set is obtained from UCI repository [40] . The 10 percent training data set consisting of 494,021 connection records is used. Each connection can be classified as normal traffic or one of 22 different classes of attacks. All attacks fall into four main categories: DOS, Remote-to-local, User-to-root, and Probing (Probe). For each connection, 41 features are recorded, including seven discrete features and 34 continuous features. Since our algorithm is calculated for continuous features, the discrete features such as protocol (TCP/UDP/ICMP), service type (http/ftp/telnet/...) and TCP status flag (SF/REJ/...) are mapped into distinct positive integers from 0 to W À 1 (W is the number of states for a specific discrete feature). For three features spanning over a very large range, namely "duration," "src bytes," and "dst bytes," logarithmic scale is applied to reduce the ranges. Finally, all the 41 features are linearly scaled to the range [0, 1]. The task of anomaly localization on the intrusion detection data set is to identify the set of features most relevant to a specific anomaly, which is similar to feature selection.
Model Evaluation
For evaluation, since our focus is anomaly localization, we did not evaluate anomaly detection although our method is able to do both. We used the standard ROC curves and area under ROC curve (AUC) to evaluate the anomaly localization performance. There is no training phase because our framework is unsupervised. Below, we introduce the details regarding the construction of ROC curves.
As defined in (8), a higher abnormal score indicates a higher probability the source is abnormal, which is the same as that of the baseline methods [23] , [22] , [21] . To have a fair comparison, we compared the normalized abnormal score among each method. The reason for normalization is that the anomaly scores generated by the baseline methods have different orders of magnitude. We used the term "anomaly score" to refer to the normalized abnormal score in the following analysis.
For each data window, the abnormal score vector ¼ ½ 1 ; . . . ; p T was generated and compared with a cutoff threshold between ½0; 1 to separate abnormal sources and innocent sources. We performed the same procedure for all the data windows, and finally, we obtained a prediction matrix with size w by p, such that w is the number of data window and p is the number of sources. Each entry in the prediction matrix is 0 or 1 to indicate whether the source is normal or abnormal. Comparing the prediction matrix with the ground truth resulted in a pair of true-positive rate (TPR) and false-positive rate (FPR), where TPR is the total number of true detected abnormal sources over the total number of abnormal sources, and FPR is the total number of incorrect detected abnormal sources over the total number of normal sources in W windows. By changing the threshold, we obtained the ROC curve and the AUC value.
For network traffic data set, we evaluated our method in a qualitative because there is no ground truth about which features contribute to the observed anomaly, also there is no To better demonstrate the effectiveness of JSPCA and GJSPCA, we also compare our results with those obtained from other feature selection methods such as information gain [41] and SVM [42] on KDDCUP 99 data set.
Anomaly Localization Performance
We have two parameters to tune in JSPCA: 1 : controlling the sparsity, and k: the dimension of normal subspace. GJSPCA has two more parameters: 2 : controlling the smoothness, and , the correlation threshold to construct the correlation graph. For the other two methods, we need to select the number of neighbors k for SSN, regularization parameter for SSL and the number of clusters c for EEC. We first performed a grid search for each method to identify the optimal parameters and then compared the performance. The performances of different methods depend on the parameter selection. We evaluated the sensitivity of our results in the next selection.
For each data set, we tuned 1 and 2 within f2 À8 ; 2 À7 ; . . . ; 2 8 g and from 0.1 to 0.9. k was tuned from 1 to 4 for the stock market and sensor data, and from 2 to 7 for the motor current data. All the ranges were set by empirical knowledge. Our empirical study showed that the performance did not change significantly as the parameters vary in a wide range, which reduced the parameter search space significantly. Table 5 lists the best parameter combination for JSPCA and GJSPCA. For SNN, we tuned the number of neighbors k in the range 2-6 (for stock index data set and sensor data) and in the range 2-10 (for motorcurrent data), respectively. For the EEC method, the number of clusters c was tuned between 2-4. For SSL, we tuned the the same range as 1 in JSPCA.
In Fig. 7 , we show the performances for the four methods on three different data sets. JSPCA and GJSPCA clearly outperform the other three methods. The AUC values of JSPCA and GJSPCA are both above 0.85 on three data sets, while that of EEC, SNN, and SSL are around [0.5-0.6]. Compared with JSPCA, GJSPCA is slightly better, which supports our hypothesis on the importance of incorporating the structure information of network data streams into anomaly localization. SNN clearly outperforms EEC on sensor data and is comparable with EEC for the other two data sets. SSL outperforms SSN and ECC for two data sets.
We did a case study in which PCA, SPCA, JSPCA, and GJSPCA are compared on a selected time interval. As shown in Fig. 5 , PCA is not able to identify the abnormal sources. SPCA fails to localize source 7 and introduces many false positives when threshold is wrongly selected. To further support the argument that PCA and SPCA are inadequate for anomaly localization, we did experiment on stock indices data and calculated AUC. We found the AUC value of PCA and SPCA are 0.0667 and 0.6703, respectively, which are much lower compared to that of JSPCA. We do not extend our experiments to the other data sets since the two methods are clearly not competitive.
We also test the KLE extension of localization methods and Table 6 lists the best parameter combination. In Fig. 8 , we show the performance of JSKLE and GJSKLE in comparison with JSPCA and GJSPCA with N ¼ 2. From the Figure, we observe that KLE extension does not outperform JSPCA and GJSPCA on anomaly localization with the expense of introducing more computational complexity due to the data matrix expansion. However, KLE extension stabilizes localization performance as shown in the section of parameter selection.
Feature Selection Performance
As mentioned earlier, anomaly localization on the KDDCUP 99 intrusion detection data set performs as a feature relevant analysis. Localizing abnormal data streams amounts to identify features most related to a specific anomaly. More specifically, our algorithm aims to identify a set of relevant features among all the 41 features for each type of attacks. The features are indexed and given in Table 3 . In Fig. 9 , we show the abnormal scores for the 41 features under the attack of DOS computed by SNN, EEC, and GJSPCA, respectively. Since four joint sparse methods provide similar abnormal scores, we just show the result of GJSPCA in Fig. 9 . Features 5, 6, 23, 24, 32, and 33 are the most relevant for DOS attack, which is reasonable since the nature of DOS attacks involves many connections to some host(s) in a very short period of time. In Table 4 , we summarize the most relevant features for each attack from our method GJSPCA. Our result is consistent with the relevant features found in Mukkamala and Sung [43] using SVM.
Parameter Selection
In this section, we evaluated the sensitivity of our methods to different modeling parameters. To do so, we selected one parameter at a time, systematically changed its value while fixing the others at their optimal values. Although our approaches have more parameters than the other two methods, the sensitivity analysis shows that performances of our methods are remarkably stable over a wide range of parameters. Next, we show the sensitivity study on the stock indices data set for the parameters 1 and 2 , , k. Similar results are observed on the other two data sets.
In Fig. 10 , we show the stability by changing 1 in GJSPCA. We observe that AUC is quite stable over a wide range of 1 . A similar phenomenon is also observed when changing 2 . On the middle part of Fig. 10 , we performed sensitivity analysis on parameter . We observe that AUC remains stable for 2 ½0:15; 0:6. When ¼ 0, the graph is a complete graph and the smoothness regularization will penalize the loadings of each source across the PCs to be similar each other. Hence, very low leads to a worse performance. On the other hand, when ¼ 1, the graph is just a set of isolated sources. The structure information is missing; therefore, the performance is not optimal.
An important parameter in PCA-based anomaly detection methods is k, the number of PCs spanning the normal subspace. In [12] , Ringberg et al. claimed that the anomaly detection performance was sensitive to k. Such a claim is confirmed in the second subfigure of Fig. 10 , where the overall AUC gradually decreases from 0.96 to 0.72 as k changes from 1 to 3 and then increases to 0.77 at k ¼ 4. Compared with GJSPCA, GJSKLE significantly stabilize the localization performance when (the threshold for deriving network topology) and k (dimension of normal space) change. As shown in Fig. 11 , when changes from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1, AUC increases to its optimum 0.94 at Fig. 9 . Anomaly localization comparison of stochastic nearest neighborhood, EEC, GJSPCA on network intrusion data set (DoS attack). ¼ 0:5, and then decreases 3 percent to its minimum 0.91 at ¼ 1. Furthermore, AUC remains above 0.9 for k 2 ½1; 4. JSKLE and GJSKLE involves one more parameter: the temporal offset N. To test the sensitivity of N, we repeated the experiments of KLE with different Ns from 1 to 5 on the finance data set. Note that (G)JSPCA is a special case of (G)JSKLE when N ¼ 1. The result is shown in Fig. 12 . With the change of N, AUC performance is very stable. The difference between the optimal case (N ¼ 1) and the worse case (N ¼ 5) is just 0.07. It may be apparent that N ¼ 1 (degenerated to (G)JSPCA) is better than other cases. However, by selecting N ¼ 2, AUC of GJSKLE is stabilized when changing and k as shown in Fig. 11 compared with GSPCA in Fig. 10 .
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Previous work on PCA-based anomaly detection claimed that PCA cannot be used for anomaly localization. We proposed two novel approaches, JSPCA and GJSPCA, for anomaly detection and localization in network data streams. By enforcing joint sparseness on PCs and incorporating the structure information of network via regularization, we significantly extended the applicability of PCA-based technique for localization. Moreover, we developed JSKLE and GJSKLE based on multidimensional KLE that considers both spatial and temporal domains of data streams to stabilize localization performance. Our experimental studies on three real-world data sets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Our future works will focus on two directions: 1) how to efficiently and effectively select model parameters; and 2) how to extend our approach to kernel PCA. Fig. 11 . Sensitivity analysis of GJSKLE on stock indices data set. From left to right: , the dimension of the normal subspace, 1 and 2 . Fig. 12 . Sensitivity analysis of GJSKLE on stock indices data set on N. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
